Case TS-957F378B2 Nov 2026researchCompound claim

AI

“Apple's paper 'The Illusion of Thinking' found that reasoning AI models such as Claude, Gemini, and GPT collapse to zero accuracy on hard puzzles even when given the exact algorithm to solve them, showing they are not really thinking but are instead very good at pattern matching.”

Plain restatementA 2025 paper by Apple researchers titled "The Illusion of Thinking" reports that large reasoning models reach near-zero accuracy on puzzle tasks beyond a complexity threshold, that supplying the solution algorithm in the prompt did not prevent this, and the claim further asserts this establishes that such models do not reason and instead perform pattern matching. The claim names Claude, Gemini and GPT as the models tested.

Partially accurate but misleadingConfidence High
What this verdict means →

The paper is real. Apple researchers published "The Illusion of Thinking" in June 2025, and it was later accepted at the NeurIPS 2025 conference. It does report that reasoning models hit zero accuracy on puzzles past a certain difficulty, and that handing the models the exact solution algorithm did not help. But the post gets two things wrong. First, Gemini and GPT were not tested. The models evaluated were Claude 3.7 Sonnet, OpenAI's o3-mini, and two DeepSeek models, all from late 2024 or early 2025. Second, the paper does not conclude that models are "not really thinking." It asks that as an open question and says its four puzzle types are a narrow slice of reasoning that may not reflect real-world tasks. Other researchers have since argued the collapse was partly caused by the test design, including output length limits and some river-crossing puzzles that were mathematically impossible to solve, and the Apple authors published a reply defending their findings. The debate is live, not settled.

The drift / as claimed vs as evidenced

[drifted from the evidence:] Apple's paper 'The Illusion of Thinking' [drifted from the evidence:] found that reasoning [drifted from the evidence:] AI models [drifted from the evidence:] such as Claude, Gemini, and GPT collapse to zero accuracy on [drifted from the evidence:] hard puzzles even when given the [drifted from the evidence:] exact algorithm [drifted from the evidence:] to solve them, showing they are not [drifted from the evidence:] really thinking but are instead [drifted from the evidence:] very good at pattern matching.


[added by the neutral restatement:] A 2025 paper [added by the neutral restatement:] by Apple researchers titled "The Illusion of Thinking" [added by the neutral restatement:] reports that [added by the neutral restatement:] large reasoning models [added by the neutral restatement:] reach near-zero accuracy on [added by the neutral restatement:] puzzle tasks beyond a complexity threshold, that supplying the [added by the neutral restatement:] solution algorithm [added by the neutral restatement:] in the prompt did not [added by the neutral restatement:] prevent this, and the claim further asserts this establishes that such models do not reason and instead [added by the neutral restatement:] perform pattern matching. [added by the neutral restatement:] The claim names Claude, Gemini and GPT as the models tested.

Red-tinted words in the claim drifted from the evidence. Green-tinted words are what a neutral restatement needs.

The trace / claim to source

Where it appeared
scale conflation
capability extrapolation
⌿ Omitted qualifier
A load-bearing condition from the source quietly disappears from the claim.
◔ Subgroup generalization
A result observed in a narrow group is presented as true for everyone.
↺ Date or context mismatch
Real material from one time or place presented as another.
harness mismatch
Primary sourcerefereed conference proceedings
Shojaee, Mirzadeh, Alizadeh Vahid, Horton, Bengio, Farajtabar, "The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity," NeurIPS 2025 camera-ready proceedings PDF
Primary sourcevendor-hosted author copy
Same paper, Apple-hosted PDF
Primary sourcepreprint of record, version history
Same paper, arXiv 2506.06941 (v1 and v3 HTML)
Primary sourceinstitutional publication record
Apple Machine Learning Research, NeurIPS 2025 accepted-papers and schedule page
Primary sourceunrefereed comment preprint
C. Opus and A. Lawsen, "The Illusion of the Illusion of Thinking: A Comment on Shojaee et al. (2025)," arXiv 2506.09250
Primary sourceunrefereed preprint
"Rethinking the Illusion of Thinking," arXiv 2507.01231
● Primary source found
What is true
  • The paper exists, is authored by Apple researchers, is titled "The Illusion of Thinking," and was accepted at NeurIPS 2025. It is not a fringe or retracted document.
  • The paper does report complete accuracy collapse, described in its own words as zero accuracy, beyond a model-specific complexity threshold on its puzzle environments.
  • The paper does report that providing the solution algorithm in the prompt did not improve performance, and that collapse occurred at roughly the same point. This was shown for Tower of Hanoi and, in the later version, Checker Jumping.
  • The three-regime structure the post describes is in the paper, with one correction noted below.
  • The specific anecdote in the post is accurate: for Claude 3.7 Sonnet thinking, the paper reports a first error around move 100 on Tower of Hanoi at N=10, versus a valid solution only to move 4 on River Crossing.
  • The post's account of the authors' explanation is accurate in substance: the paper attributes the difference to River Crossing examples with more than two pairs being scarce on the web, and uses hedged language, "likely suggests" and "may not have."
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet thinking was genuinely among the tested models.
What is misleading
  • The claim says the models tested were "Claude, Gemini, and GPT." The paper's experiments evaluated o3-mini, DeepSeek-R1, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B and Claude 3.7 Sonnet thinking. No Gemini model was evaluated, and no GPT-branded model was evaluated. Gemini appears only in the introduction as an example of the model class. Naming the three most consumer-recognisable brands converts a result about four specific 2025-era systems into an apparent result about every chatbot the audience uses.
  • The claim says the paper shows models "are not really thinking but are instead very good at pattern matching." The paper asks this as an open question in its introduction and states its findings raise questions about the nature of reasoning capabilities. Its asserted finding is the narrower one that the models fail to develop generalizable problem-solving capabilities for planning tasks. A question posed is presented as a conclusion reached.
  • The claim drops the scope the paper itself states, that four puzzle environments are a narrow slice of reasoning tasks that may not capture real-world or knowledge-intensive reasoning. It also drops the scoring format, which required emitting the full move sequence, a condition the critiques argue is what is actually being measured at large N.
  • The claim does not mention that part of the original River Crossing evidence rested on mathematically unsolvable configurations, nor that the authors narrowed that analysis in the later version while maintaining their conclusion.
  • The claim is phrased in the present tense about what reasoning models do. The measurements are of models released around late 2024 and early 2025. As of 2026-11-02, no evidence was found here that this specific puzzle suite has been re-run under the original harness on current frontier models, so the present-tense generalisation is not supported by the cited paper.
  • The claim presents the finding as settled while two published critiques and a replication report materially different outcomes after changing the output format or removing unsolvable instances. The post's framing that the paper "blows open" the question omits that the question is actively contested in the literature.
  • A smaller point of detail: the post says that on easy puzzles "the regular models did just as well." The paper reports that at low complexity non-thinking models were more accurate and more token-efficient, so they did better, not merely as well.
What is uncertain
  • Whether the collapse reflects a reasoning limit or an output-format and token-budget artifact remains genuinely open. The refereed paper says the former, two unrefereed critiques say the latter, and the authors' rebuttal is itself part of the refereed version. No independent refereed replication settling this was located.
  • Whether the training-data-scarcity explanation for the Hanoi versus River Crossing gap is correct. The paper offers it as a hedged conjecture and does not test it directly against training corpora.
  • How current frontier models perform on the paper's exact four environments under the paper's exact scoring. No such evaluation was located as of 2026-11-02.
  • Whether the paper's puzzle findings transfer to the kinds of tasks most users care about. The paper explicitly declines to claim this.
Evidence summary

The paper exists, is by Apple researchers, and is not merely a preprint: Apple's own research site lists it as a main venue accepted paper at NeurIPS 2025, with a poster session on Wednesday, December 3, and the NeurIPS proceedings version is published. On the collapse finding, the paper's own words: "Through extensive experimentation across diverse puzzles, we show that frontier LRMs face a complete accuracy collapse beyond certain complexities." The paper describes three regimes, with low-complexity tasks where non-thinking models are more accurate and token-efficient, medium-complexity tasks where additional thinking shows an advantage, and high-complexity tasks where both model types collapse completely. On the algorithm experiment: "As shown in Figure 8, in the Tower of Hanoi and Checker Jumping puzzle environments, even when we provide the algorithm in the prompt, so that the model only needs to execute the prescribed steps, performance does not improve, and the observed collapse still occurs at roughly the same point on both puzzle environments." On which models were tested, the proceedings text states: "Our experiments evaluate five thinking models: o3-mini (medium and high configurations), DeepSeek-R1, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, and Claude-3.7-Sonnet", compared against non-thinking counterparts, specifically DeepSeek-R1/V3 and Claude 3.7 Sonnet thinking/non-thinking. Gemini appears only in the introduction's list of examples of this model class, alongside OpenAI's o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1 and Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, not in the experiments. On the "pattern matching" framing, the paper poses it as an open question rather than a conclusion. The introduction asks whether these models are capable "of generalizable reasoning, or are they leveraging different forms of pattern matching", and the abstract states the results are "ultimately raising crucial questions about their true reasoning capabilities". The paper's substantive negative finding is narrower: these models "fail to develop generalizable problem-solving capabilities for planning tasks". The paper also states its own limits: "We acknowledge that our work has limitations. While our puzzle environments enable controlled experimentation with fine-grained control over problem complexity, they represent a narrow slice of reasoning tasks and may not capture the diversity of real-world or knowledge-intensive reasoning problems." Two published critiques contest the interpretation. The Opus and Lawsen comment argues the findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures, raising output token limits that models explicitly acknowledge, an evaluation framework that does not distinguish reasoning failures from practical constraints, and River Crossing instances that are mathematically impossible for N greater than or equal to 6 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet scored as failures. When they changed the output format, asking for a Lua function instead of an exhaustive move list, they report high accuracy across Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Claude Opus 4, OpenAI o3 and Google Gemini 2.5 on Tower of Hanoi at N=15, in under 5,000 tokens, though they note budget constraints limited the testing. A separate replication using Gemini 2.5 Pro reports that by fixing boat capacity at 3 and increasing N beyond 5, the original experiments include unsolvable configurations, and that on valid instances even large cases such as N=100 with capacity 4, requiring up to 200 correct moves, are solved reliably. The authors responded in the later paper version. They state that restricting River Crossing to N below 6 "does not invalidate our core findings, as performance of models mostly collapse earlier from N=3, which requires only an 11-move solution", and that they ran the algorithm-provision test on an additional puzzle, Checker Jumping, which they chose because it requires fewer moves than Tower of Hanoi and appears to have less algorithmic familiarity, concluding that the results "suggest a more fundamental failure mode in reasoning models, rather than one specific to the Tower of Hanoi." On the post's Hanoi versus River Crossing point: the paper reports that for Claude 3.7 Sonnet thinking, in Tower of Hanoi the first error often occurs around move 100 for N=10, compared to River Crossing where the model produces a valid solution only until move 4, and offers the explanation that this "likely suggests that examples of River Crossing with N>2 are scarce on the web, meaning LRMs may not have frequently encountered or memorized such instances during training."

Complete reasoning
The underlying paper is real, refereed at NeurIPS 2025, and genuinely reports both the accuracy collapse and the failure of algorithm provision to help, so the factual core of the claim checks out against the primary artifact. The claim nonetheless misstates which models were tested, naming Gemini and GPT when neither was evaluated, and converts the paper's explicitly open question about pattern matching into a stated conclusion that models are "not really thinking," while omitting the paper's own narrow-slice limitation and the substantial published dispute over whether the collapse is an artifact of the output format and of unsolvable test instances. "Mostly accurate" was considered and rejected because the attributed conclusion is not one the paper draws and the model roster is wrong, which changes meaning rather than simplifying it. "False" was rejected because the central empirical findings are correctly reported, and "Superseded" was rejected because this is a dated historical research finding rather than a present-tense superlative, though its present-tense framing is stale as of 2026-11-02.
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